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Stable Matching
| Title: | Stable Matching |
| Author: | Peter Gammie |
| Submission date: | 2016-10-24 |
| Abstract: | We mechanize proofs of several results from the matching with contracts literature, which generalize those of the classical two-sided matching scenarios that go by the name of stable marriage. Our focus is on game theoretic issues. Along the way we develop executable algorithms for computing optimal stable matches. |
| BibTeX: |
@article{Stable_Matching-AFP,
author = {Peter Gammie},
title = {Stable Matching},
journal = {Archive of Formal Proofs},
month = oct,
year = 2016,
note = {\url{http://isa-afp.org/entries/Stable_Matching.html},
Formal proof development},
ISSN = {2150-914x},
}
|
| License: | BSD License |
| Status: [ok] | This is a development version of this entry. It might change over time and is not stable. Please refer to release versions for citations. |
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