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VCG
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Combinatorial
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
Auctions
Title: |
VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions |
Authors:
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Marco B. Caminati,
Manfred Kerber,
Christoph Lange (math /dot/ semantic /dot/ web /at/ gmail /dot/ com) and
Colin Rowat (c /dot/ rowat /at/ bham /dot/ ac /dot/ uk)
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Submission date: |
2015-04-30 |
Abstract: |
A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and
Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey
auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from
which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We
formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove
that the functions for the allocation and the price determination are
well-defined. Furthermore we show that the allocation function
allocates goods only to participants, only goods in the auction are
allocated, and no good is allocated twice. We also show that the price
function is non-negative. These properties also hold for the
automatically extracted Scala code. |
BibTeX: |
@article{Vickrey_Clarke_Groves-AFP,
author = {Marco B. Caminati and Manfred Kerber and Christoph Lange and Colin Rowat},
title = {VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions},
journal = {Archive of Formal Proofs},
month = apr,
year = 2015,
note = {\url{http://isa-afp.org/entries/Vickrey_Clarke_Groves.html},
Formal proof development},
ISSN = {2150-914x},
}
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License: |
BSD License |
Status: [ok] |
This is a development version of this entry. It might change over time
and is not stable. Please refer to release versions for citations.
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